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CORPORATIONS-THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL FRANCIIlSE TAXATION-MIC:HIGAN FRANCHISE TAX-The present inquiry, besides delving into the nature of corporate organizational franchise taxation,1 will
also seek to arrive at a logical theoretical basis for two of the more common types of such levies, and will conclude by examining the pertinent
Michigan statutes in the light of such theories.

I
Although the term, "corporate franchise tax" has been used to
cover a number of different types of exactions,2 it is generally applied
to levies laid on either the privilege to be a corporation or on that of
doing business in a corporate capacity. 3 A consideration of these measures necessarily requires a knowledge of the franchises upon which
they are imposed. The franchise "to· be" is the grant of corporate life
from the state-the right merely to exist in corporate form. 4 On the
other hand, the franchise "to do" represents that grant of power from
the state which enables the recipient to conduct corporate business.5
It should also be noted that although any functioning corporation must
of necessity have been the recipient of both grants, the state need not
tax both, but may choose either franchise as an object for its taxing
power. 6
Turning now to the development of a theory of corporate franchise
taxation, an initial step to be taken is the assumption that the statute is
I

This teim will be used to denote &anchise taxes which are basically laid as of the time

of organization rather than periodic exactions.

2 See 51 AM. ]UR. §809 (1944).
3 14 FLBTCHBR, CYc. CoRP. 645 (1945).
4 Id. at 652; see also, In re Detroit Properties Corp., 254 Mich. 523, 236 N.W. 850
(1931).
5 14 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. 653 (1945).
6 Id. at 648. That both franchises may be subject .to taxation is likewise clear. Adams
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185, 17 S.Ct. 604 (1897).
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to be designed solely for the purpose of raising revenue. 7 Next we must
further assume that like economic interests should be treated alike. 8
This unfortunately poses the additional problem of choosing a system
for measuring the values of the franchise interests.
Although the question of determining economic worth or value is
one which has long perplexed economists, it is generally believed that
the most useful general definition of the concept is the one which
stresses the relative importance of the subject matter with regard to its
capacity to perform services for particular persons. 9 Even doubting the
usefulness of such a general definition, it would seem that for the
7 An enactment which requires the payment of a sum in excess of the reasonable expenses
of filing and of regulation is to be considered an exercise of the taxing power and hence a
revenue measure. Vernor v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157, 146 N.W. 338 (1914). See
also Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W. 353
(1921) (necessarily implying that the Michigan organizational franchise fee is a tax, a result
of which might well be reached under many statutes). However, it should be noted that the
taxing power of the state can be used for regulation. RO'ITsCHAllFER, CoNSnTOTIONAL LAw
624 (1939). In light of this fact, might not necessarily police power objectives operate to
vitiate theories based on the assumption that the statute is to be designed strictly as a revenue
measure? Not necessarily. It should first be noted that many regulatory objectives can be
achieved within the frame-work of a corporate franchise taxation statute designed solely to
raise revenue. Later in the comment, a Hat sum tax on the franchise "to be" will be advocated
as a revenue measure. This tax can serve as the necessary financial barrier to eliminate
"random" incorporation. Again, strictly as a revenue measure, a tax on the franchise "to do"
in proportion to the extent of prospective business activity will be proposed. Such a fund
raising device can achieve the desirable end of inducing incorporators to reveal the facts as to
their potential operations, thus curtailing investor deception. Secondly, even assuming police
power objectives beyond those attainable under statutes designed purely for revenue, if revenue
is one of the goals of the levy, knowledge of what standards are required for the equitable
raising of funds will enable a more intelligent compromise to be reached between these
standards and those which are required for the attainment of the other statutory aims. If, of
course, revenue is not a legislative objective, then the theories to be evolved based on this
assumption will be useless.
s Under the Federal Constitution such a broad premise is not required. As long as the
tax classification and the taxing bases set up by the statute are not purely arbitrary or capri•
cious, the measure will be held to meet the equal protection requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus a franchise tax which imposed a levy of five cents on each one hundred
dollars of authorized stock and which also set an arbitrary capitalization figure of one hundred
dollars for each share of no-par stock, was held to be valid. Roberts and Schaefer Co. v.
Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50, 46 S.Ct. 375 (1926); 40 HAnv. L. REv. 139 (1926). For a view
questioning the propriety of the theory of the case, see Wickersham, "Taxation of No Par
Value Stock,'' 39 HAnv. L. REv. 289 (1926). Despite the existence of a broad era for
constitutionally permissible action, it would seem that except where the taxing power is being
used for regulatory purposes or where such attempts would result in unworkably complex
taxing statutes, legislation in this field should be aimed at burdening equal economic interests
equally.
9 "In economics, things are deemed to have value for their supposed capacity to perform
services, and in that department of economics which is concerned with the value of property,
things are assumed to have value for their capacity to perform services for those persons who
can exploit them by exercising the powers of ownership." 1 BON.BRIGHT, Tm! VALUATION
oF PROPERTY 14 (1937). See also Commons, "Law and Economics," 34 YALE L.J. 371 at
377 (1925).

1132

-MrcmGAN LAw REVIEW

[ Vol. 48. ·

particular problem of taxation herein presented, this' criterion is probably the best evidence of the economic power a given franchise represents. This is so since here resort to other commonly used evidence of
value will prove fruitless. Market value cannot be utilized because the
franchises under consideration are apparently inalienable:10 Secondly,
since the cost of the franchises is a purely arbitrary matter, depending
solely upon what the state decides to charge ( which assumedly ought
to be determined by the value of the franchise), that standard is of no
use. Proceeding then on the theory that here "value to the owner" is
the best measure of economic worth, that value standard must be applied to the two specific kinds of franchises-"to be" and "to do." What
then is.the proper basis for taxing a franchise "to be"? It seems clear
that the mere right to exist. in corporate form is of equal value to all
corporations. Since such a grant confers no power to act as a corporation the franchise is inherently solely capable of performing exactly
the same service for any and all grantees regardless of their potential
business activity. Proper taxation of this right would thus seem to
require the levying of the same fixed sum thereon for all· grantees. Of
course, increases in the capital stock item should be treated as being of
no moment for the purposes of this tax.
On the other hand, a franchise "to do" does confer the power to
act as a corporate entity, which power is capable of being used to perform different services in the hands of different grantees. Thus, the
proper measure of an organizational tax on such a franchise would seem
to require its being couched in terms of the volume of the potential
business activity of the grantee which in turn would be a measure of
the services which the particular business unit would derive from the
franchise, and hence of its value. As a practical matter, the determination of the potential business activity of a corporation prior to its entrance into business within the state might be extremely difficult.11 In
the light of this problem, a compromise may be required between theory
and legislative convenience. To effect this. balance, some states have
10 This conclusion would seem to How from the inherent nature of the franchise. The
Michigan statute seems to bear out the inference. See 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1947 Cum.
Supp.) §21.203. It would seem that whenever the exchange value is not equal to the use
value of a commodity, market value is an inaccurate measure of its economic worth. Another
example of such a situation is that of a peculiarly designed building such as the New York
Stock Exchange, the market value of which is undoubtedly far less than the worth of the
economic benefits it confers upon its present owners.
11 Even in the case of a foreign corporation, having a long history of out-of-state operation,
since the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution requires that a tax such as the one
under consideration be apportioned with regard to the intra-state activity of the corporation
[Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 190 (1910)], the same
problem of prior determination would exist.
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chosen as a taxing basis the par value of the authorized capital stock,12
or in the case of no-par stock, its initial selling price or initial book
value.13 Although it must be admitted that these measures do not accurately reHect prospective business activity, the capital stock item and
analogous :figures almost always give some indication of the extent of
the use to which the franchise will be put, and in view of the relatively
small sums which are usually involved, they may be sufficiently
precise.14
One further theoretical question remains and that is whether a
statute taxing only the franchise "to dd' upon organization, and which
in the case of par stock operates by imposition of the levy on the authorized capital stock, should be designed to tax increases in that capital
stock. The answer would seem to be clearly in the negative. The
organizational tax on the franchise "to do," _since it is imposed only at
the time of incorporation, must be designed to measure prospective
business activity. Due to the difficulty of measuring this quantity, the
capital stock item, though a crude index, may in the light of legislative
convenience be sufficiently accurate. However, once tjle corporation
begins to conduct business, not only can the worth of its franchise be
more accurately measured by an easily determinable basis keyed to
present activity, but the sole use of the capital stock :figure for this
purpose is completely deceptive.~ 5 Thus the organizational taxing statute on the franchise "to do" should not be used in theory to gain revenue from subsequent corporate operations by taxing increases in the
capital stock item. Rather a separate statute taxing post-organizational
activity should be framed.

II
Approaching the Michigan statutes, the :first step in analyzing the
pertinent corporate franchise sections involves a determination of their
nature. One section imposes an annual levy on the privilege of carrying
12 Some states apparently more nearly measure prospective business activity by taxing
on the basis of the stock actually issued and outstanding. 14 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §6963
(1945).
13 See 14 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §§6963, 6964 (1945). Reference to §6964 will show
that the bases for no-par taxation run the gamut, however.
14 Under the rate laid down by the New York statute, 59 N.Y. Code Ann. (McKinney,
1943) §180, a corporation with an authorized capital stock item of $100,000 would be required
to pay a tax of $50. The administrative expense in determining a more accurate measure of
potential activity might exceed this sum.
15 See Bonbright, "The Danger of Shares without Par Value," 24 CoL. L, REv. 449 at
450 (1924), in which the author points out that the capital stock item of an operating corporation in no way represents its value.

1134

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 48

on corporate activity. 16 Two sections deal with valuation,17 and the
:final pertinent section imposes the organizational franchise tax1 8 which
will be hereafter considered. To treat the present provision properly,
it is necessary to consider the law as it existed before 1921 when the
current statute was enacted.19 At that time, Michigan law required
the payment of "a franchise fee of½ of one mill upon each dollar of
the authorized capital stock."20 This statute was identical on the pertinent points with an earlier enactment21 which had received interpretation in the case of Coit and Co. 11. Sutton. 22 In this case, the court
through dicta stated that the tax was on the "privilege of doing business,"23 thus indicating that the statute taxed the franchise "to do."
However, in 1921, after the legislature had recast the provisions into
almost their present form, 24 the court was presented with a case which
necessitated a decision as to the nature of the new enactments.25 In
this case, the court held :first that the newly imposed annual privilege
fee was laid on the franchise "to do," and second, that the organizational
franchise tax, which was essentially like the pre-1921 law, was really
on the franchise "to be.''26
_
Noting, then, that the organizational tax is on the franchise "to be,"
it might be well to correlate its treatment under the Michigan statute
16 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.205.
1115 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.204, §21.208.
18 15 Mich. Stat. Ann (1947 Cum. Supp.) §21.203.
10 Mich. Pub. Acts (1921), Act No. 85, §3.
20 Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) §11352 (1). ·
21 Mich. Pub. Acts (1893), Act No. 79.
22 102 Mich. 324, 60 N.W. 690 (1894).
2s Id. at 327.
24 At this time, one of the no-par valuation sections [Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.204]
had not been enacted, it having been originally added in 1925 (Act No. 223, P.A. 1925 as
amended by Act No. 25.3, P.A. 1927).
·
25 Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W. 353
(1921).
.
26 The statements in the earlier case of Coit and Co. v. Sutton, 102 Mich. 324, 60 N.W.
690 ( 1894), were reconciled on apparently tenuous grounds. The court said that the franchise
"to do" necessarily follows the franchise "to be," although the former may not be the subject
of taxation. Thus, although the statement of the court in the prior case appeared to be in
terms of the franchise "to do," the tax might have actually been imposed on the co-incident
franchise "to be," which this court arbitrarily decreed to be the case, even though the statute
stated that the levy was imposed "as an organization fee and for the privilege of exercising
its franchise." 15 Mich. Stat. Ann·. (1947 Cum. Supp.) §21.203. Although the formal
logic of this position appears to be questionable, the result would appear to be desirable.
It was apparently occasioned by a seemingly excessively restrictive provision of the Michigan
Constitution [§1, Art. 10 (1908)], which stated that all subjects of taxation which were
contributing to the primary school fund in 1908, should continue to so contribute. Since
there had been a corporate franchise tax at this time, and secondly, since it would have
been very difficult to construe the annual privilege fee as a tax on the franchise "to be,"
and, thirdly, since the primary school fund was already well financed, the court was constrained to consider the organizational tax as being upon the franchise "to be." ,
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with our· previously developed theory that taxation of this franchise
should be in terms of a flat sum for all corporations.
The statute contains the following pertinent provisions:
Sec. 3: "Every domestic corporation hereafter organized for
profit . . . shall at the time of filing its articles . . . pay to the
Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission, as an organization fee and for the privilege of exercising its franchises within
this state, a sum equal to ½ mill upon the dollar for each dollar of
the authorized capital stock of such corporation: ... And provided
further, That every corporation heretofore or hereafter incorporated ... which shall thereafter increase its authorized capital stock
... shall pay a sum equal to ½ mill upon each dollar for each and
any increase in its authorized capital stock."27
Sec. 3a: ''The value placed upon each share of stock of no
par value by a corporation for the purpose of sale, or for exchange
for property, or other stock, or for any other purpose, shall be
taken as the basis of the franchise fees required at the time of incorporation or upon the increase of capital of a corporation for
profit. Such value for tax purposes and for computation of franchise fees shall be at least one (I) dollar. Where any shares of
stock shall within one ( l) year after incorporation or within one
(I) year after an increase in capital be exchanged for property or
for other stock at a price in excess of that stated in the articles of
association, ... there shall be paid to the Secretary of State [Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission] on account thereof
an additonal franchise fee, such fee to be computed at the same
rate as in the case of original incorporation: Provided, That no
additional franchise fee shall be required where the value placed
upon such shares is based upon earnings of a corporation."28
Sec. 5: "... For the purpose of this act only, each share of no
par value shall be deemed to have the value 9f at least one (I)
dollar, or such value as shall have been fixed by the corporation
for the sale of such stock, or the book value as determined by the
secretary of state, whichever may be the higher." 29 •
Clearly the statute in section 3 is not in accord with the previously
developed theory both with respect to the designation of the capital
stock item as the taxable basis and to the allowance of taxation on the
increase thereof. Since this legislative pattern seems not to have been
15 Mich. Stat. .Ann. (1947 Cum. Supp.) §21.203.
15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.204.
20 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.208.
21

28
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dictated by any supervening police power objective,30 it seems fair to
discuss the statutes as revenue measures and to criticize them as such.
Even assuming the law to remain unchanged, the theory may be of
some value in the determination of ambiguities under the present provisions. A recent Michigan case illustrates the latter situation.31 A
corporation had begun business with 10,000 shares of no-par stock
proposed to be sold at $1 per share. Later it had increased its capitalization to l 00,000 shares on the same basis. Then at a time when the
book value of the shares was $3.85, a certificate of decrease to 66,670
shares was. filed. This reduction in the number of shares actually represented an increase in the book value of $156,675.50, which for the
purpose of the statute was to ·be treated as an increase in the capital
stock item. The question presented to the court was whether this
increase in capitalization could properly be taxed under the aforementioned statutes or, put another way, did the statute authorize taxation
only of an increase in the number of shares or did it also authorize taxation on the increase of the capital stock item? On the basis of the
statutory language, equally sound arguments could be made for both
contentions.
The argument for taxability is that the language of section 3 places
the initial levy "upon the dollar for each dollar of the authorized capital
stock" and the additional levy "upon each dollar for each and any
increase in its authorized capital stock."· This language might be read
placing emphasis on the former phrase, prompting the conclusion that
the tax is in reality on the dollar value of the stock and the increase in
. that dollar value. The prohibition set out in section 3a against requiring an additjonal franchise fee where the value placed upon the shares
is based upon earnings can be explained by saying that section 3a was
passed to prevent a situation which could otherwise occur under section
5 whereby a corporation could take in just enough capital on incorporation or on an increase of its stock so as to allow if to set the value of
its shares at the minimum figure of one dollar. Later, the stock could
be exchanged for property in excess of the minimum figure and no
additional tax could be collected. Section 3a prevents this if the latter
transaction occurs within one year after incorporation or increase. The
"earnings" proviso, so the argument goes, was inserted to exempt earn30 Note the tenor of the opinion in Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State,
216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W. 353 (1921).
31 Waterways Navigation Co. v. State, 323 Mich. 153, 35 N.W. (2d) 227 (1948).
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ings made within that period from the general treatment of section 3a
and for no other purpose.32
The opposing position could be maintained by arguing that section
3 states definitely that the corporation "shall pay a sum equal to½ mill
upon each dollar for each and any 'increase' in its authorized capital
stock.'~ Moreover, the "earnings" proviso of section 3a is in no way
limited by the prior language of that section, but rather it deals
with all no-par valuation. This being so, "increase" must be interpreted
to mean increase in the number of shares if any consistency between
these provisions is to be attained. This was the view of the Michigan
court. If the decision were rested on the competing contentions of
statutory construction the result could not have been other than intuitive. However, viewed in the light of the afore-noted theory, the holding seems to be beneficial, since as previously pointed out, increases in
the capital stock item should not afford a basis for the imposition of an
additional tax on the franchise "to do," and the present case, by restricting taxation of such increase to the statutory minimum, would
seem to have taken the proper course.

Charles Hansen, S.Ed.

82 See appellant's brief in Waterways Navigation Company v. State, 323 Mich. 153,
35 N.W. (2d) 227 (1948).

